MERCHANT MARINE INTEREST, Continuing coverage of the Unintentional Grounding and Sinking of the Costa Concordia
Tracking the Continuing Saga of the COSTA CONCORDIA:
If there was one concept that the old American Admiralty Bureau Forensic Examiners hammered home in the admiralty courts of America in the 1990s it was the concept of the "causation matrix." Bureau examiners were aware of the court's search for the "proximate cause" in most maritime accidents but always took pains to trace out and describe the entire "causation matrix" of proximate and primary causes and contributing factors. If the proximate cause was "human error" by the officer in charge of the navigation watch, the Bureau Forensic Examiners always asked why the error was made. If say, "fatigue" was a factor, the inquiry would continue, why? If fatigue was a normal product of a two watch system instead of the standard and recommended three watch system, a managerial choice under certain circumstances; then "fatigue" was a contributing factor and could become a liability game changer.
If crew fatigue is a predictable by product of a managerial choice and a contributing factor in an accident, the ship owner may not be able to take advantage of the "limitation of liability". This is a relief that American courts offer ship owners in accidents not caused by anything within their "privity and knowledge." Thus the "proximate cause"; human error by the officer in charge of the navigation watch remains the same but the liability cookie crumbles differently.
Of course we are not saying that fatigue was a factor in the Costa Concordia accident, we simply don't know the causation matrix yet, we are just providing an example of how the concept works. Continuing our example; the officer in charge of the navigation watch is usually a professional with a third party competency certification. In the past owners were rarely held liable for his professional errors. But if a contributing factor was fatigue and fatigue becomes predictable as a result of corporate policies, the owners may no longer stand behind the old defense of; "We hired a licensed professional and should have been able to rely on his judgment." Judges often found that argument compelling and allowed limitation of liability, limiting the ship owners liability for the results of the accident to the post accident value of their ship and cargo and any freight pending. Now that causation is more often considered a matrix rather than a single factor, and contributing factors are more often identified in the investigative phase, it is harder to predict how liability may be apportioned by the courts in the end.
As my old torts professor used to say; "You need three actors for a tort. The tort feasor is the actor who did the negligent thing that caused injury. The tort victim is the party injured? Thedeep pocket is the party from which the tort victim seeks compensation, and may not be one and the same as the tort feasor, often the deep pocket is an insurance company. If any of these actors are missing, most especially the deep pocket, you don't have a tort case."
The modern day extension of investigation into proximate cause and all contributing factors often acts to hold the only real "deep pockets," the ship owner and his insurers, in the case where historically they may have escaped through the ever narrowing "limitation of liability" hatch. Merchant Marine Officers may be able to purchase "license defense insurance" so that they can afford legal counsel in the event of an accident. But it is virtually impossible for licensed officers to purchase meaningful liability insurance. Even an officer who is eventually completely exonerated in the wake of an accident is usually financially ruined before the end of related litigation. The Italian Coast Guard appears fully up to date on maritime investigative techniques and the concept of the causation matrix. Follow the provided hyper link to the excellent and free maritime daily news service and blog for maritime professionals gCaptain. com where they are detailing the aftermath of this latest cruise ship accident daily.
MERCHANT MARINE INTERESTS:
COSTA CONCORDIA DISASTER: AN ANALYSIS OF DRUG TEST RESULTS AND NAVIGATIONAL DEFENSES
The hyperlink below will take you to the recent (Feb. 19, 2012) Huff Post (World) article that describes the results of the drug tests on Captain Francesco Schettino. In reviewing this article despite the alarming banner headline here are the important points to keep in mind:
(1) The Captain's urine and hair samples tested drug free
(2) The Cocaine traces described in the headline were on the outside of the hair
and not in the hair. Only a positive finding in the hair would indicate drug usage.
(3) The principal defense offered so far is that the reef struck was not on the
navigation charts.
Here is our analysis of these recent announcements:
We agree with Marcello Chiarotti, the Italian forensic expert who examined the drug test results. He stated that the modest trace of cocaine on the outside of the hair sample and in the sample envelope "was a marginal problem that absolutely doesn't invalidate the results of the analysis." The Captain's urine tested drug free. Hair samples are also tested because drug traces remain in the hair shaft far longer than in urine. A positive hair test for consumption of a drug is a finding of traces within the hair shaft. There can be many explanations for traces of anything being found on the outside of a hair shaft. The most likely one will probably never be mentioned by either side.
The authorities would probably rather not bring it up and the defense would probably not like to irritate the authorities, but over attention by inexperienced journalists could force the issue. The most common explanation for traces of a controlled substance showing up on the outside of a hair sample or sample container are lab or collection error. These tests take place in labs where all sorts of controlled substances are present. Sometimes the samples are collected by law enforcement personnel who may have been involved recently at other crime scenes. It doesn't require negligence to contaminate a sample, it requires technical proficiency at the lab to distinguish positive indicators from the false, its a dirty world out there and the test labs aren't vacuum sealed environments.
We have no problem accepting the Italian forensic expert's opinion that the cocaine traces on the outside of the hair sample and in the sample envelope are more probably than not meaningless. This of course won't stop the prosecution from trying to use this information as an incendiary device. We don't know enough about the Italian rules of evidence to venture a prediction on the admissibility of the finding to make a prediction that it will or will not be brought up in trial. But the presence of related civil suits and media interest will keep it alive for a while longer.
The authorities would probably rather not bring it up and the defense would probably not like to irritate the authorities, but over attention by inexperienced journalists could force the issue. The most common explanation for traces of a controlled substance showing up on the outside of a hair sample or sample container are lab or collection error. These tests take place in labs where all sorts of controlled substances are present. Sometimes the samples are collected by law enforcement personnel who may have been involved recently at other crime scenes. It doesn't require negligence to contaminate a sample, it requires technical proficiency at the lab to distinguish positive indicators from the false, its a dirty world out there and the test labs aren't vacuum sealed environments.
We have no problem accepting the Italian forensic expert's opinion that the cocaine traces on the outside of the hair sample and in the sample envelope are more probably than not meaningless. This of course won't stop the prosecution from trying to use this information as an incendiary device. We don't know enough about the Italian rules of evidence to venture a prediction on the admissibility of the finding to make a prediction that it will or will not be brought up in trial. But the presence of related civil suits and media interest will keep it alive for a while longer.
At the moment, we think ultimately the outcome of the trial will hinge on the navigational evidence and on codes and standards that address margins for error. The Captain claims the reef that his ship struck was not charted. We doubt that it was not charted at all, but such a submarine feature could easily not be completely charted. The battle over this issue will be fierce. If the Captain can demonstrate that the charting of the reef was beyond the standards of accuracy in modern charting not only does he mitigate or eliminate his own culpability but also may pull a new "deep pocket" into the civil side of the cases.
As my old torts instructor used to say "you need three persons (real or corporate) for a tort". "First you need a tort victim, the person injured by the wrongful action. Second you need a tort feasor, the person who committed the wrongful action. Finally, and most importantly you need a deep pocket, the person real or corporate who will pay the damages to the tort victim. If any of the three, but most importantly the deep pocket, are missing, you have no case." If it can be demonstrated that the reef was not charted to within acceptable standards a new deep pocket in the form of the charting authority is introduced along with some exculpatory evidence in the criminal prosecution. In admiralty law we have shrunk from the standard of absolute personal responsibility that once existed. In ancient Roman times a local pilot who ran a ship aground could be taken to the bow and immediately beheaded by the ship's master. Admiralty justice is much slower and more deliberative now and the penalties somewhat less draconian. Modern admiralty law even recognizes that on occasion there occurs the "inevitable accident" that is no one's "fault." However what is rare, but more common in causation determination than the "inevitable accident" is a finding of "non-negligent error of judgment." Attacking chart accuracy is a defense tactic designed to move the court towards a view of causation as a non negligent error in judgment, the kind of thing that courts are loath to send people to prison for. A finding of not guilty in the criminal case wouldn't stop the civil suits any more than it did in the OJ Simpson trial in this country.
Such a finding however in the criminal prosecution based on any level of acceptance of the inaccurate chart defense introduces the charting authority and perhaps others as potential deep pockets. In the civil suits this does two things. First it provides the principal alleged tort feasor, the captain with the "empty chair defense." The "empty chair defense" simply refers to the idea that others besides the defendant before the court may seriously share in liability and the plaintiff has not joined all seriously potential liable parties. This alone can stop and indefinitely delay a trial. The Captain is not a deep pocket, the cruise line, their insurance company and the charting authority or producer if either can be joined are deep pockets. A defendant may settle with one defendant and still proceed to trial with the others as long as all of the seriously potential tort feasors were joined in the civil action at the start of the court filings. By settling with the weaker deep pockets a plaintiff often gains some advantages in terms of evidence on the remaining defendants. The earliest settling defendants often get out for the face value of their insurance or less.
There are standards of accuracy in every form of navigation and in chart construction, nothing is perfect, every mariner knows this. This is why pilots for local obstructed waters are still around, they carry in their heads daily knowledge of the changes in pilot waters and greater familiarity of the level of accuracy of available charts and the "ground truth" of the waterway. It is fool hardy to navigate in such a manner as to place within your maneuver domain (the area it takes to execute a turn, a stop, or a complete 180 degree course reversal) a charted hazard. It is also poor seamanship to bring your maneuver domain within a known margin for error of either chart accuracy and/or the accuracy of the particular navigational method the master is using at the moment and a charted hazard.
Defense lawyers in admiralty often argue charting inaccuracy based on distance from the charted object to the hull of the ship at the last "fixed position." Astute prosecutors have the ship's maneuver domain expertly defined and use this larger space around the ship to help define a "safe distance off." Often admiralty lawyers and judges who often have no actual seafaring experience get lost in all of this. Juries of laymen even more so. Will justice and truth prevail? More than anything this will depend on expert witness testimony and how well the Italian admiralty courts have become at detecting and rejecting "junk science." Helping eliminate junk science from the admiralty courts is one of the missions of American Admiralty Books. Once fully developed this site should be an easy to use resource for finding authentic codes and standards the best defense against junk science.
In the mean time we hope our readers will monitor how much attention is paid to the Cocaine dust on the hair sample and in the envelope. This is a distraction, and too much attention may indicate a weakness in the prosecution. The weakness might be paying too little attention paid to the real issues of charting accuracy and decisions made based on maneuvering domain based estimates of safe distances off. If the defense charting information and maneuver judgment defense begins with measurements that don't include the maneuver domain and there is no prosecutorial response, it is likely that the whole case will be settled on junk science and emotional judgments rather than the real facts. On the other hand there may be other factors of potential negligence that we know nothing about at the moment, factors just as real as those we've outlined here and perhaps more compelling and more easily understood by a judge or jury. Prosecutors may legitimately focus on the most understandable of the evidence if it alone is sufficient to make the case. Our only point so far is to demonstrate to our readers just how complex these cases can be and to urge avoidance of a rush to judgment.
Costa Concordia Disaster: Francesco Schettino Hair Sample Showed Traces Of Cocaine On Outside Of Hair
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We repeat our observation that none of the available information currently being published has stood the test of admissibility as evidence yet, and no witnesses have been sworn or cross examined as yet. The testing of the information and witnesses will begin soon and will be reported in the media. Some of that information we will hyperlink to here and perhaps analyze and comment upon. But in doing so we remind everyone that none of the information is fully tested until the final gavel in an official tribunal or investigative forum sounds. We also remind our visitors of our earlier observation that causation in an accident is rarely sole, proximate, and direct but more usually associated with a matrix of primary causes and contributing factors. Today, modern transportation forensic professionals believe all elements of the "causation matrix" should be examined and described in detail in official investigations.
In cautioning against the "the rush to judgment" we don't believe that the Nautical Institute intended to request a cessation of media coverage of the event. We would join the Nautical Institute in calling for more use of qualifying and cautionary language and the avoidance of sensationalism in the media coverage. We do believe that the public, especially the potential passenger public, has an interest in the causation and lessons learned. Without careful media coverage prior to the formal convening of an official forum, we doubt that a "technical" forum's findings would make it past the editorial desk of many general news outlets. The media itself has an obligation to help keep public interest high enough to care about the final findings and to demand that legislators consider any actions that the official fact finders might suggest to prevent a similar event in the future. So we will continue to carry some coverage and analysis of the event. We will also take pains to remind every one of the untested and sometimes speculative nature of any such coverage. It should be the purpose of all pre-official inquiry findings coverage to keep up public interest and understanding until the gavel finally pounds. That will be quite a while from now.
American Admiralty Books is not part of the news media. However as a reviewer of all English language maritime literature we monitor the media, describe various strictly maritime media outlets, provide links to such maritime news sources, and occasionally offer analysis of some aspects of highly publicized events as we have in this case. We want to attract to our site visitors who want to know what our group of maritime professionals think about a publication before buying it. We want to attract the researcher in need of reliable information on anything maritime. Our blog postings allows us to look up every now and then at current events and offer comments on the daily news of consequence to maritime professionals, and once in a while the general public.Our first dedication is to the truth, be that truth technical, legal, factual, or historical. As reviewers of other people's writings we offer a lot of opinion. We do our utmost to insure that our opinion is based on a review of the truth, but we wish to remind our site visitors and readers that our "recommendations," "suggestions," and other comments about publications, periodicals, and web sites reviewed or simply described herein is just that, opinion.
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MERCHANT MARINE INTEREST, Hyperlink to Accident Coverage
The hyperlink associated with this blog entry will take you to website with multiple entries by multiple professionals including a track line narration by a Master Mariner, accident reconstructionists and numerous comments by reviewers.MERCHANT MARINE INTEREST, Unintentional Grounding
The Nautical Institute Weighs in on COSTA CONCORDIA
The Nautical Institute is a well respected international body of professional mariners that concerns itself with a wide variety of maritime operational, managerial, labor, and technical issues that affect the lives, and the professions, associated with seafaring commerce. We invite our readers to compare the Nautical Institute's position (via the associated hyperlink) with the cautionary note that we published in our earlier blog on the subject. American Admiralty Books shares the concern of the Nautical Institute over the apparent rush to judgment in this case. We repeat our previously expressed concern that our visitors read our own posted information, and all media coverage and analysis in this period prior to the conclusion of the official inquiries with great circumspection.
We repeat our observation that none of the available information currently being published has stood the test of admissibility as evidence yet, and no witnesses have been sworn or cross examined as yet. The testing of the information and witnesses will begin soon and will be reported in the media. Some of that information we will hyperlink to here and perhaps analyze and comment upon. But in doing so we remind everyone that none of the information is fully tested until the final gavel in an official tribunal or investigative forum sounds. We also remind our visitors of our earlier observation that causation in an accident is rarely sole, proximate, and direct but more usually associated with a matrix of primary causes and contributing factors. Today, modern transportation forensic professionals believe all elements of the "causation matrix" should be examined and described in detail in official investigations.
In cautioning against the "the rush to judgment" we don't believe that the Nautical Institute intended to request a cessation of media coverage of the event. We would join the Nautical Institute in calling for more use of qualifying and cautionary language and the avoidance of sensationalism in the media coverage. We do believe that the public, especially the potential passenger public, has an interest in the causation and lessons learned. Without careful media coverage prior to the formal convening of an official forum, we doubt that a "technical" forum's findings would make it past the editorial desk of many general news outlets. The media itself has an obligation to help keep public interest high enough to care about the final findings and to demand that legislators consider any actions that the official fact finders might suggest to prevent a similar event in the future. So we will continue to carry some coverage and analysis of the event. We will also take pains to remind every one of the untested and sometimes speculative nature of any such coverage. It should be the purpose of all pre-official inquiry findings coverage to keep up public interest and understanding until the gavel finally pounds. That will be quite a while from now.
American Admiralty Books is not part of the news media. However as a reviewer of all English language maritime literature we monitor the media, describe various strictly maritime media outlets, provide links to such maritime news sources, and occasionally offer analysis of some aspects of highly publicized events as we have in this case. We want to attract to our site visitors who want to know what our group of maritime professionals think about a publication before buying it. We want to attract the researcher in need of reliable information on anything maritime. Our blog postings allows us to look up every now and then at current events and offer comments on the daily news of consequence to maritime professionals, and once in a while the general public.Our first dedication is to the truth, be that truth technical, legal, factual, or historical. As reviewers of other people's writings we offer a lot of opinion. We do our utmost to insure that our opinion is based on a review of the truth, but we wish to remind our site visitors and readers that our "recommendations," "suggestions," and other comments about publications, periodicals, and web sites reviewed or simply described herein is just that, opinion.
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MERCHANT MARINE INTEREST, Opinion
Editor's Note: We ran this guest blog shortly after the COSTA CONCORDIA accident. Since then there have been some other accidents and another recent cruise ship incident that didn't involve sinking, but again there is a lot of professional discussion and not a few formal regulatory inquiries going on over the duties of the master. NOW we learn that the Master of the COSTA CONCORDIA is on trial in Italy on multiple counts of man slaughter. We thought this post is again relevant and worth reexamining.
An old seaman's saying goes "a good captain goes down with his ship". The typical "land lubber" often asks why. It's a legitimate question. My phone has been ringing off the wall and my E-mail stuffed with requests for explanations all day. Why would I have any idea?
I'm a licensed American Merchant Marine Officer who has served as Master and Pilot on large American registered excursion vessels and ferries ranging from 400 passenger capacity to 1400 passenger capacity. Those who know me know that I've had some job losing disputes with management over passenger safety. In one well known argument, that I actually won, I asked a vessel owner who at first didn't want to order the additional children's life jackets that I asked for to imagine himself in my position if something happened. What kid do I deny a life jacket to? How do I ever leave the sinking craft in an adult sized life jacket if children don't have one? What do I tell their mothers? You might note that in that argument one thing I was trying to preserve was not only the lives of children too small for typical life jackets ("personal flotation devices " in the parlance of the regulations) but my own apparent right to abandon ship. That's right folks the Captain has an inherent right to take action to save his own life if he has fulfilled his duties. The reason that "good captains" often go down with the ship is the nature of the duties. Let's look at those duties and why they so often lead to a Captain's death.
My Uncle, Captain Earnest Douglas, a Master Mariner during World War II survived the sinking of his ship by a German torpedo. Fortunately the ship went down somewhat slowly. He had ordered abandonment and received the Chief Officer's report that all surviving crew were "present or accounted for." He secured the bridge, took the log and other papers not on the destruction bill and embarked the life boat where he checked the roster. One old seaman, with a bit of a drinking habit was not present. Asking questions he learned he had not been on watch in any damaged compartment and was in fact off duty. asking a few more questions he became dissatisfied with the nature of the pre- abandonment compartment check. He climbed back up the Jacob ladder determined to search the sinking ship, and as luck would have it, discovered the old seamen unconscious and un-wakeable in his bunk. He carried the old man down to the life boat. Uncle Ernie did not go down with his ship, nor suffer any recriminations for its loss.
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MERCHANT MARINE INTEREST, Opinion
Editor's Note: We ran this guest blog shortly after the COSTA CONCORDIA accident. Since then there have been some other accidents and another recent cruise ship incident that didn't involve sinking, but again there is a lot of professional discussion and not a few formal regulatory inquiries going on over the duties of the master. NOW we learn that the Master of the COSTA CONCORDIA is on trial in Italy on multiple counts of man slaughter. We thought this post is again relevant and worth reexamining.
The COSTA CONCORDIA: Must a Captain Go Down with His Ship?
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| Public domain image of 19th Century ship wreck in progress |
I'm a licensed American Merchant Marine Officer who has served as Master and Pilot on large American registered excursion vessels and ferries ranging from 400 passenger capacity to 1400 passenger capacity. Those who know me know that I've had some job losing disputes with management over passenger safety. In one well known argument, that I actually won, I asked a vessel owner who at first didn't want to order the additional children's life jackets that I asked for to imagine himself in my position if something happened. What kid do I deny a life jacket to? How do I ever leave the sinking craft in an adult sized life jacket if children don't have one? What do I tell their mothers? You might note that in that argument one thing I was trying to preserve was not only the lives of children too small for typical life jackets ("personal flotation devices " in the parlance of the regulations) but my own apparent right to abandon ship. That's right folks the Captain has an inherent right to take action to save his own life if he has fulfilled his duties. The reason that "good captains" often go down with the ship is the nature of the duties. Let's look at those duties and why they so often lead to a Captain's death.
The first duty of a Master in a situation likely to result in the total loss of the ship is to decide to either abandon ship or conduct damage control. Depending on the size of the vessel, and the professionalism of the subordinate officers available to him, and the nature of interior ship communications, this duty may require a personal damage survey and assessment. Some Captains have been lost, trapped in rapidly flooding compartments, or blown away by fire and explosion during the initial damage assessment survey leaving the decision to abandon to a surviving subordinate. If the Captain decides to conduct damage control the decision to abandon ship is deferred but damage control may include a decision for partial abandonment when passengers are involved. The Captain may order everyone not involved in dewatering, counter flooding, or fire fighting to take to the life boats. If the damage control efforts go south it is the Captain's duty or that of the surviving senior officer to order abandonment. Of necessity, the Captain is the last man off, sometimes he doesn't make it.
Regardless of how soon after discovery of flooding or fire abandonment follows, the Master always has the duty to insure that abandonment is carried out as orderly and safely as possible under the circumstances. This means a maximum effort at accounting for everyone and seeing them safely off the ship. What constitutes a good faith effort? Generally as good of a head count as possible under the circumstances and a diligent search of all unflooded or combustion free compartments for any missing. Under ideal conditions there is a life boat muster roll, orderly embarkation, a head count, a search for anyone not answering muster and an eventual declaration by the Chief Officer to the Captain that all hands are present or accounted for. "Accounted for" means that any missing crew or passengers were seen jumping off the ship, or did not turn up on a search of unflooded compartments. Ship's officers aren't required to enter burning compartments, or flooded, or flooding compartments once an abandonment order is given. Abandonment is ordered when damage is progressive and proceeding at an irreversible rate. Only after the maximum possible effort under the circumstances of the individual case has been made to account for, and evacuate all crew and passengers, may the Captain disembark. Yet under many circumstances he may not be able to disembark yet.
There was a recent case of a fishing vessel in Alaska where after the crew was in inflatable life craft the Captain became aware that the life craft's emergency alert and locating device was not working. He returned to the pilothouse and successfully got off a radio message to the U.S. Coast Guard with the position of his vessel, its survivors, and the nature of their distress. This radio call is credited with the coast Guard's successful rescue of the crew before they could die of exposure, an not unlikely outcome for a fishing vessel in North Sea if no body knew they were in trouble and where they were at the moment of abandonment. Unfortunately that final trip to the pilot house cost the Captain his life but saved the lives of his crew. He was a "good captain" who went down with his ship. Not because he was obligated to do so on some principle of honor but as he continued "to work the problem" he ran out of time.
My Uncle, Captain Earnest Douglas, a Master Mariner during World War II survived the sinking of his ship by a German torpedo. Fortunately the ship went down somewhat slowly. He had ordered abandonment and received the Chief Officer's report that all surviving crew were "present or accounted for." He secured the bridge, took the log and other papers not on the destruction bill and embarked the life boat where he checked the roster. One old seaman, with a bit of a drinking habit was not present. Asking questions he learned he had not been on watch in any damaged compartment and was in fact off duty. asking a few more questions he became dissatisfied with the nature of the pre- abandonment compartment check. He climbed back up the Jacob ladder determined to search the sinking ship, and as luck would have it, discovered the old seamen unconscious and un-wakeable in his bunk. He carried the old man down to the life boat. Uncle Ernie did not go down with his ship, nor suffer any recriminations for its loss.
Sometimes after total abandonment, the master still stays aboard due to other duties. When a master orders abandonment out of an abundance of caution on a ship progressive but slow flooding and has gotten off a call for help, he may stay aboard. While the ship's crew may have lacked the equipment to stop the flooding he may be aware of commercial salvers or Coast Guard like forces on the way. When they arrive his presence is needed to assist with the salvage effort and to preserve certain rights of the owner. Sometimes such Captains miscalculate the rapidly changing stability situation and get caught in a violent capsize while the vessel still seems to have ample free board to stay afloat. The "good captain" knows his duties and in an abandonment situation these duties often extend his on board time into unfortunate circumstances.
Those captains who have of late claimed that they abandoned ship before all crew and passengers are off in order to manage rescue and salvage efforts from shore are completely out of touch with reality. Ashore is where we find professional salvage masters and Coast Guard rescue coordinators. These people are far better qualified and connected to move assistance from shore to distressed ship. The Captain is needed on scene, preferably aboard, to help coordinate where his superior knowledge of his own ship and the situation can do the most good. There is no international law that outlines these duties of the Master on a sinking or burning ship. However some national laws, and this is true I understand of Italy recognizing these traditions borne of necessity, do require the Master to stay aboard or on scene until relieved by proper authority or forced off by real necessity. No Captain is bound by any tradition to go down with his ship but honor, tradition, and some law require him to continuously "work the problem." Some times the "problem wins."
Occasionally, as may have been the case in the TITANIC, a captain works the problem until almost the bitter end and deliberately decides to forego his last chance for survival. The Captain of the TITANIC is mostly remembered as a tragic figure today, an unlucky but brave individual. Suppose he had survived? Would he have been remembered for those he saved or lost? How would the story of his failure of moral courage in not refusing corporate demands to run at high speed through known ice burg infested waters have played out in the media of the day? Because he went down with his ship "working the problem" history has not judged him a villain. "Good captains go down with their ship" because they either run out of time or make a choice but not out of any tradition or law that requires it. It has cost me a job or two, but I find the moral courage to argue with, or refuse an employer over a safety issue infinitely preferable to having to exercise the physical courage of a "good captain" in an abandonment situation. I believe that such exercise of moral courage, coupled with a little luck, is responsible for my arrival at the safe harbor of 63 and retirement without losing a vessel and facing the "good captain's" unfortunate choices. There were a number of owners who refused to acknowledge me as a "good" captain, but there are no passenger or crew ghosts haunting me.
Capt. Ray Bollinger
American Master and Pilot
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